By Matthew J. LaMourie
On April 11, a divided Maine Law Court resolved a closely-watched issue in
favor of workers when it ruled that a discrimination claim brought under state
law, based on a person’s physical or mental disability, need not require that
person show that their condition imposes a “substantial limitation on a major
life activity.” In effect, the Court’s ruling means that the
anti-discrimination protections under Maine’s Human Rights Act are available to
a far broader group of workers than those available under the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA). The ramifications of the Law Court’s decision in
Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. will be far-reaching for Maine
businesses in terms of both their obligations to so-called disabled workers and
their exposure to legal action for non-compliance.
As readers of this newsletter know, the issue reached the Maine Law Court
after Federal District Judge D. Brock Hornby requested that it interpret an
unsettled state law question for his use in a lawsuit pending in U.S. District
Court. In that dispute, Stanley Whitney sued Wal-Mart after he was removed
from his salaried management position when he could not satisfy a specific
work-hour requirement imposed in connection with a return from leave.
Wal-Mart offered, and Mr. Whitney accepted, another position in a lower-paying
managerial capacity at another store, but Mr. Whitney subsequently sued on
grounds of disability and age discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act –
not federal law – alleging that Wal-Mart refused a request for accommodation in
connection with the work-hour requirement they imposed following his
leave. Wal-Mart contended that Mr. Whitney’s heart condition did not make
him a qualifying individual with a disability because he was not “substantially
limited in any major life activity.”
In a 4-3 decision, the Law Court determined that an employee seeking the
disability discrimination protections of the Maine Human Rights Act need not
show
that his or her condition “substantially limits a major life activity.”
Unlike the more restrictive definition set forth in federal law, the Maine
Legislature has defined the term “physical and mental disability” far more
broadly, encompassing “any disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement,
congenital defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, accident,
disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or illness, and includes the
physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial
disability as determined by a physician or, in the case of mental disability, by
a psychiatrist or psychologist, as well as any other health or sensory
impairment that requires special education, vocational rehabilitation or related
services.” The Whitney decision will almost certainly
eliminate the prior legal uncertainties associated with the question of whether
employees with chronic back pain, heart disease, carpal tunnel syndrome,
clinical depression and other diagnosable ailments, are defined as disabled
under state law.
Over the years, navigating the differences between the statutory language and
related legal obligations imposed by the ADA and Maine Human Rights Act has been
challenging for Maine employers. While Whitney has conferred one
benefit upon employers to the extent it resolved a longstanding uncertainty in
the scope of the disability protections provided by state law, there is no doubt
that the Court’s decision effectively lowers the qualification threshold for
Maine workers seeking to enforce disability discrimination protections.
Moreover, since the Law Court’s decision expressly invalidates Maine Human
Rights Commission regulations that contained the phrase “substantially limits
one or more of [a] person’s major life activities,” Maine employers now face a
total absence of meaningful administrative guidance on how the state law
formulation of “disability” should be interpreted.
Owing to the broader scope of the Maine Act, Whitney will likely
result in a higher volume of charges of discrimination brought before the Maine
Human Rights Commission, a decrease in the number of disability discrimination
claims brought pursuant to federal law here in Maine, and a need for employers
to more closely scrutinize their employees’ ability to perform essential
functions of their jobs and the extent to which accommodating an employee’s
condition is appropriate and legally necessary. It remains to be seen
whether during its next session, the Maine Legislature will respond by amending
language in the Maine Human Rights Act, which is unlikely, or if Maine will join
a growing list of states – including New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
California and Oregon -- whose disability discrimination protections cover a far
broader group of employees. For the foreseeable future, we recommend that
Maine employers exercise greater care in evaluating worker requests for such
accommodations as flexible schedules, time off for medical appointments, and
modifications in communication, job feedback and/or supervision.