In March, as expected, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right of an
employee to bring a hostile environment sex harassment claim in which the
employee and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the
defendant) are of the same gender. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., the Court put to rest a split among Federal courts on the issue
of whether same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In affirming the right of an employee to bring such suits, the Court made
clear that harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire in order to
support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. The applicable
evidentiary requirement is not related to proof that the conduct at issue was
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but rather proof that the conduct
constituted “discrimination…because of…sex.”
While it might be argued that this is a somewhat broader scope of proof, in
the context of litigation it is more elusive. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing
for the majority, stated, “A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific
and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.
A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.’
In its opinion, the Court also touched on a debate that
has simmered in scholarly circles lately about the extent to which the evolution
of sexual harassment laws is creating a sort of political correctness in the
workplace. Justice Scalia discounted the possibility that the Court’s decision
could result in Title VII expanding into a “general civility code.”
Specifically:
[Title VII] does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite
sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither
asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so
objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objective hostile or abusive work environment – an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive – is beyond
Title VII’s purview…We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as
sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake – such as
male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation – for discriminatory
“conditions of employment.”
Since the Court’s opinion overrules the Fifth
Circuit’s decision on this issue, Oncale now goes back to the district court
level and ultimately to trial, unless the parties resolve the matter through
settlement.