Because the remedies provided by Maine’s wage payment protection statute are
some of the most employee-friendly in the country, employers must be
particularly vigilant about ensuring that they make a timely payment of all
earned compensation to employees who leave their jobs. Failure to do so
can expose an employer to liability for the amount of the unpaid wages and a
reasonable rate of interest, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney’s
fee, and an additional amount equal to twice the amount of unpaid wages. 26
M.R.S.A. §§ 626, 626-A.
Naturally, employers who face a Section 626 claim have an incentive to
explore numerous factual and legal defenses in an effort to avoid
liability. In a recent decision by Maine’s Law Court, however, an effort
by Maine Medical Center to have an implied bad faith element read into Section
626 was rejected, leaving them on the hook for over $80,000, plus attorney’s
fees. Bisbing v. Maine Medical Center, 2003 ME 49, 820
A.2d 582.
In the underlying dispute, an emergency room doctor with Maine Medical
Center, Spence Bisbing, demanded payment of accrued, unused vacation pay
following his resignation in 2000. Maine Medical Center refused, claiming
that he used all his vacation time, and a lawsuit ensued. Although the
issue of whether Maine Medical Center acted in bad faith was not submitted to
the jury at trial, on appeal of the Section 626-A remedies entered in Bisbing’s
favor, Maine Med argued, among other things, that in order to enter an award of
liquidated damages and attorney’s fees under the statute, there had to have been
a finding of bad faith or culpability on its part.
There is no express language in either Section 626 or 626-A to suggest
that a plaintiff must prove bad faith on the part of a defendant employer to
trigger the penal components of the statute, namely its liquidated damages and
fee-shifting provisions. Nevertheless, the fact that other jurisdictions
have recognized the need for a plaintiff to prove willfulness or bad faith by a
nonpaying employer in similar circumstances, coupled with the logic inherent in
the argument that any law with consequences as severe as those associated with
Section 626 should require what amounts to some measure of blameworthiness, lent
some credence to Maine Med’s appellate strategy.
The Law Court was not
persuaded. Relying on the plain language of Section 626, the Court
declined to impose a bad faith element in the absence of clear legislative
intent to do so. Citing language from two of its earlier interpretations
of Section 626, the Court reiterated the importance of the statute’s “broadly
protective purpose” and found no reason to deviate from its consistent refusal
to recognize the existence of exceptions or exemptions from the statute’s harsh
effects.
Although the appellate decision in Bisbing was no
surprise, the fact that one of Maine’s largest employers was unable to extract
itself from the impact of Section 626 should motivate more modest employers to
audit their termination practices and fully familiarize themselves with their
obligations under that statute.